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AFTER HLEG: EU BANKS, CLIMATE CHANGE ABATEMENT AND THE 
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 
Jay Cullen* 
 
ABSTRACT 
The EU is making progress in reducing its carbon footprint. The creation of a High-
Level Group on Sustainable Finance (HLEG) has supplemented recent market-led 
initiatives and provided some recommendations for future reform. This article argues 
that more remains to be achieved. In particular, in light of the fundamental structural 
uncertainties attached to climate change, precautionary approaches to the funding of 
GHG-intensive industries are worth contemplating. Such measures include raising the 
capital requirements on assHWV ZLWK µEURZQ¶ FUHGHQWLDOV 7KH KLJK GHSHQGHQFH RQ
banks for external financing in the EU makes these reforms particularly appropriate 
for implementation within the bloc. 
  
I. INTRODUCTION 
The European Union has been at the forefront of climate change mitigation policies. Warnings about 
the unsustainability of current greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions continue to emanate from science, 
academia and governments.1 There have been numerous recent global initiatives purposed to tackle 
the issue, resulting in the signing of several supra-national accords aimed at reducing the potential for 
excessive carbon pollution of the earth and its atmosphere.2 
                                                          
1
 ,Q-DQXDU\WKH³'RRPVGD\&ORFN´RIWKH$WRPLF6FLHQWLVWV6FLHQFHDQG6HFXULW\%RDUGZDVPRYHGE\
VHFRQGVWR³WZRPLQXWHVWRPLGQLJKW´LWVFORVHVWSRVLWLRQWRPLGQLJKWVLQFH7KLVPHWDSKRULFDOGHYLFH
LQGLFDWHVWKH$WRPLF6FLHQWLVW%RDUG¶Vestimation of the threat level to global order. They attributed this partially 
WR WKH ODFN RI DFWLRQ LQ ³DYRLGLQJ FDWDVWURSKLF WHPSHUDWXUH LQFUHDVHV LQ WKH ORQJ UXQ >ZKLFK@ UHTXLUHV XUJHQW
attention now. Global carbon dioxide emissions have not yet shown the beginnings of the sustained decline 
towards zero that must occur if ever-JUHDWHUZDUPLQJLVWREHDYRLGHG«WKHJOREDOUHVSRQVHKDVIDOOHQIDUVKRUW
RIPHHWLQJWKLVFKDOOHQJH´6HH$WRPLF6FLHQWLVWV6FLHQFHDQG6HFXULW\%RDUGµ,WLVPLQXWHVWRPLGQLJKW: 2018 
'RRPVGD\&ORFN6WDWHPHQW¶Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 25 January 2018, p2.  
2
 See for example, the Paris Climate Agreement, which has the central aim of capping future global warming by 
2 degrees Celsius, was ratified in 2016 following the acceptance of its protocols by the vast majority of parties 
to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. See United Nations, Paris Agreement, 2015. 
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 7KH(8¶VSRVLWLRQLQJDVDJOREDOOHDGHULQWDFNOLQJFOLPDWHFKDQJHLV unsurprising: the TFEU 
places emphasis upon both sustainable development and environmental protection.3 TKHEORF¶s 2030 
climate and energy framework (the latest version having been adopted in 2014) sets three key targets 
for the year 2030: (i) at least 40% cuts in GHG emissions (relative to 1990 levels); (ii) at least 27% 
share for renewable energy; (iii) at least 27% improvement in energy efficiency.4 Indeed, the EU has 
committed to reducing its GHG emissions by 80 percent by 2050.5 
For the most part, the EU has approached the problem of climate change as a challenge to be 
solved by the market.  Consequently, in relation to the financial sector, EU initiatives tend to focus on 
demand-side reform, with efforts to restrict GHG emissions addressing activities undertaken by 
corporations or firms, rather than intervening to regulate the supply of credit or other financial 
instruments.6  To this end, the EU has been proactive in facilitating the introduction of new financial 
SURGXFWV ZLWK µJUHHQ¶ FUHGHQWLDOV WDNLQJ D OHDG LQ GHYHORSLQJ such markets. This has been 
operationalised both via the issuance of green financial products by EU institutions such as the 
European Investment Bank (EIB) and through the development of regulatory standards to underpin 
the development of green finance markets, where instruments such as green bonds and green ABS 
may be traded. Regulatory developments culminated in the creation of a High-Level Group on 
Sustainable Finance (HLEG), which reported in January 2018.7 2QWKHEDVLVRIWKH+/(*¶V findings, 
the EU Commission updated its sustainable finance stream of the Capital Markets Union (CMU) 
Action Plan, commenting: 
 
[E]veryone in society must play a role. The financial system is no exception. Re-orienting private 
capital to more sustainable investments requires a comprehensive rethinking of how our financial 
system works. This is necessary if the EU is to develop more sustainable economic growth, ensure the 
stability of the financial system, and foster more transparency and long-termism in the economy.  
 
In spite of these steps ± and despite the progress made in sustainable financing at the EU level ± this 
article argues that drawbacks to in relation to EU policy toward the financial sector and climate policy 
                                                          
3
 7KH /LVERQ 7UHDW\ $UWLFOH  VWDWHV µ7KH 8QLRQ VKDOO HVWDEOLVK DQ LQWHUQDO PDUNHW ,W Vhall work for the 
sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive 
social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress, and a high level of protection and 
improvement of the qualLW\ RI WKH HQYLURQPHQW ,W VKDOO SURPRWH VFLHQWLILF DQG WHFKQRORJLFDO DGYDQFH¶ 6HH
TFEU OJ 2008/C 115/01. 
4
 2030 Climate & Energy Framework, https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/strategies/2030_en accessed 26 
January 2018. 
5
 European Commission, EU Action Against Climate Change: Leading Global Action To 2020 And Beyond 
(2009) which states at p10 WKDW³>W@KHDGRSWLRQRIWKHFOLPDWHDQGHQHUJ\SDFNDJHPDNHVWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ
the first region of the world to have both committed to such ambitious targets and put in place the measures 
QHHGHGWRDFKLHYHWKHP´ 
6
 S Oberthilr and CR Kelly, EU Leadership in International Climate Policy: Achievements and Challenges 
(2008) 43 International Spectator 35. 
7
 EU High-Level Group on Sustainable Finance, Financing a Sustainable European Economy: Final Report, 
January 2018. 
3 
 
remain. The fundamental flaw in WKH (8¶V DSSURDFK in relation to the financial sector and climate 
change abatement is to entrust financial market mechanisms WRGHOLYHUWKH(8¶VJRDOV. Specifically, I 
argue that the modern risk management paradigm as applied in financial markets ± and all of the 
regulatory and institutional responses which flow from such an approach ± cannot meaningfully 
mitigate the possibility of widespread catastrophic economic losses from climate change.  
This article goes beyond the current literature on climate risks in the financial sector. Current 
analyses tend to focus either on the potential losses which the financial sector may be exposed to in 
the event of sudden shifts in regulatory policy8 IRU H[DPSOH WKH µVWUDQGHG DVVHWV¶ GHEDWH9), or  
behavioural obstacles, such as short-termism, which render attempts to  meet WKH(8¶Vown climate 
abatement goals difficult to achieve. My critique adds further nuances to an already strong case for 
further intervention. In short, even if financial markets were able to adapt their behaviour to climate 
externalities, there are deep structural uncertainties within climate science, combined with the 
inability to arrive at meaningful estimates of economic damage from climate developments (in 
essence, the presence of Knightian uncertainty)10 which destroy the viability of probability estimates 
of future damages.11 These impacts might ruin individual institutions or contribute to extreme damage 
at the systemic level. As I shall outline, reforms such as those called for by the HLEG ± which 
essentially mimic or extend existing financial regulations regarding transparency levels and 
standardisation for green financial products ± are likely to prove insufficient; in the absence of any 
reliable risk calculations upon which to base capital allocation decisions, financial institutions have 
few incentives to reduce their exposures to GHG-risky assets, even as prospective damages both to 
the financial system and wider economies remain unquantifiable.  
I do not address in this article the metrics or characteristics appropriate for assets to be 
FDWHJRULVHGDVµ*+*-ULVN\¶,QVWHDGWKHDUWLFOHraises questions as to what regulatory principles might 
be useful in the absence of reliable damage assessments from climate shifts. The critique yielded 
provides important insights for high-level public policy and the use of regulation to combat climate 
change. I argue, based on the evidence adduced in this article, that what is required in relation to such 
efforts is the extension of a precautionary approach to any future financing of GHG-intensive 
                                                          
8
 See for example AS Miller and SA Swann, µClimate Change and the Financial Sector: A Time of Risk and 
Opportunity¶ (2016) 29 Georgetown Environmental Law Review 69. 
9
 According to research, globally, a third of oil reserves, half of gas reserves and over 80 per cent of current coal 
reserves should remain unused from 2010 to 2050 in order to meet a target of 2 °C warming. Such restrictions 
would expose the financial sector to significant risks as writedowns impose losses on counterparties. See C 
McGlade and P Ekins µThe geographical distribution of fossil fuels unused when limiting global warming to 2 
°C¶ Nature 187. 
10
 This denotes outcomes (be they known, unknown or disputed), for which probability statements cannot be 
made, because the data are too ambiguous.  FH Knight Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit (Hart, Schaffner and Marx, 
1921). 
11
 M Weitzman, µOn Modeling and Interpreting the Economics of Catastrophic Climate Change¶ (2009) 91 
Review of Economics and Statistics 1, 1. 
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industries.12 The precautionary principle imposes a burden of proof on those who create potential 
risks, and it requires regulation of activities even if it cannot be shown that those activities are likely 
to produce significant harms. In the legal sphere, it is employed most appropriately as a way to tackle 
uncertain risks.13 Importantly, in the case of risks of ruin, where there is no diversifying strategy, the 
principle becomes stronger in form. Such an approach is already adopted in a number of areas of 
European jurisprudence and provides well-established principles in the creation and interpretation of 
European legislation, particularly in the environmental and international law fields. It is also 
recommended for use to guide regulatory policies on climate change.14  
As I will explain, such a principle is particularly appropriate to follow in the case of the EU, 
where banks remain the dominant credit providers. Whilst other jurisdictions such as the United 
States, China and Japan have developed deep capital markets, investment beyond the banking system 
within the EU ± with the exception of France and the UK ± remains retarded.15 In turn, any reforms to 
EU capital markets and the launch of market-based finance initiatives to promote green finance (for 
example via the CMU) are likely to be limited in impact. Indicatively, domestic bank credit in the 
euro area in 2012 amounted to 255 percent of GDP, compared to around 90 percent in the US.16 
Because banks are by far the largest source of financial capital in the EU, the effects of their lending 
policies are magnified. This also means that EU banks are relatively more exposed than those in other 
jurisdictions to negative spillovers from climate shifts: RQHVWXG\HVWLPDWHVWKHVHH[SRVXUHVH[FHHG¼
trillion, with potential losseVIURPWKHVHVHFWRUVRIEHWZHHQ¼ELOOLRQDQG¼ELOOLRQHYHQXQGHU
an orderly unwind.17 Special lessons therefore apply to the EU because of its financial structure. 
The application of a precautionary approach in relation to bank-financing of certain ESG-
risky activities would include measures to modulate the credit supply through increasing capital 
requirements on brown assets. Interestingly, the reverse of such a policy is contemplated by the 
HLEG ie. a reduction in the levels of capital to be held against green loans. This approach is wrong-
headed; it would likely reduce the resilience of the financial system and provide few incentives to rein 
                                                          
12
 For discussion of the precautionary principle and financial regulation, see ST Omarova, µLicense to Deal: 
Mandatory Approval of Complex Financial Products¶(2012) 90 Washington University Law Review 64 (arguing 
at 85 that ³adopting and operationalizing the general concept of precaution in the context of post-crisis financial 
systemic risk regulation may be a worthwhile, and even necessary, exercise.´ See also I Webb, D Baumslag and 
R Read, µHow should regulators deal with uncertainty? Insights fURP WKH 3UHFDXWLRQDU\ 3ULQFLSOH¶ Bank of 
England Underground 27 January 2017 https://bankunderground.co.uk/2017/01/27/how-should-regulators-deal-
with-uncertainty-insights-from-the-precautionary-principle/ accessed 15 March 2018. 
13
 M Faure and E Vos (eds), Jurisdische afbakening van het voorzorgsbeginsel: mogelijkheden en grenzen, 
Gezondheidsraad publicatie Nr. A03/03, (The Hague: Dutch Health Council, 2003). 
14
 CR Sunstein, µBeyoQGWKH3UHFDXWLRQDU\3ULQFLSOH¶ 151 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1003. 
7DOHE KDV DUJXHG WKDW ³6NHSWLFLVP DERXW FOLPDWH PRGHOV VKRXOG OHDG WR PRUH SUHFDXWLRQDU\ SROLFLHV LQ WKH
SUHVHQFH RI UXLQ´ 6HH NN Taleb, Silent Risk, Technical Incerto: Lectures Notes On Probability, Vol 1 
(Descartes Publishing, 2015) p23 
15
 M Ferreira, D Mendes and JC Pereira µNon-Bank Financing of European Non-)LQDQFLDO )LUPV¶ European 
Federation of Financial Analysts Societies (July 2016). 
16
 See ECB, Report on financial structures (October 2013). 
17
 F Weyzig, B Kuepper, JW van Gelder, and R van TiOEXUJ µThe Price of Doing Too Little Too Late; the 
Impact of the Carbon Bubble on the EurRSHDQ)LQDQFLDO6\VWHP¶ Green New Deal Series. 
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in lending for ESG-risky activities. Rather, the intervention I advocate would have similar effects to a 
tax, with capital regulation employed as a supply-side brake on the flow of finance, making such 
activities more costly to fund. Importantly, similar interventions to support (or disincentivise) 
particular forms of bank lending have already been enacted at the EU level. I argue that such policy 
responses are required in the face of the irreducible complexities of WKHHDUWK¶VFOLPDWH, the lack of 
scientific consensus on the shape of damages from climate change at institutional and systemic levels, 
and the non-negligible potential for widespread catastrophe.  
 
 
II. MARKET-BASED MEASURES TO CURB GHG EMISSIONS IN THE EU 
Climate pollution is regarded as a classic economic negative externality; according to the influential 
Stern Review LWLVµthe greatest example of maUNHWIDLOXUHZHKDYHHYHUVHHQ¶18 Externalities are those 
suffered by a third party as a result of an economic transaction between two or more parties to which 
it is contractually unrelated. In the absence of regulation to correct any cost burden, those costs will be 
borne by the third party, who is external to the market. From a social perspective, the distribution of 
these losses is a market failure, and unjustifiable. Emissions from climate change are widely regarded 
as a clear example of such externalities at the global scale.  
Rather than adopting a top-down, command and control approach to meeting its 
aforementioned climate commitments, the EU has instead engaged in some innovative strategies to 
UHGXFH WKH EORF¶V GHG footprint, through both mandatory and voluntary mechanisms. Support for 
such initiatives KDVEHHQ OHYHUDJHG WKURXJKWKH(8¶V institutional framework, including via the EIB 
and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), whilst supra-national bodies 
KDYH EHHQ FUHDWHG WR GHDO ZLWK ILQDQFLDO LQVWLWXWLRQV¶ H[SRVXUH to climate change, including the 
aforementioned HLEG, DQGDµ7DVN)RUFHRQ&OLPDWH5HODWHG'LVFORVXUHV¶FRQYHQHGE\WKH)LQDQFLDO
Stability Board (TCFD).19 
 
A. The European Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS)20 
The ETS was launFKHGLQDQGZRUNVRQ WKHµFDSDQG WUDGH¶ principle. The ETS encompasses 
only certain sectors across the Union, most notably the energy and heavy industries and (from 2008) 
                                                          
18
 N Stern, The Economics of Climate Change (2007) 1. 
19
 Financial Stability Board, Recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, 
Final Report, June 2017. 
20
 Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a 
scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 
96/61/EC. 
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the aviation sector.21 In brief, a cap is placed on the total amount of GHG emissions which can be 
emitted by installations covered by the system. Over time, the cap is reduced, so that aggregate 
emissions will fall.22 Companies face heavy penalties for exceeding their emissions allowances; on the 
other hand, they are permitted to buy limited volumes of international credits from emission-savings 
projects outside the EU, and may trade or bank for future use surplus allowances.23 As Campbell et al 
QRWHLQWKHDEVHQFHRIDVDWLVIDFWRU\WD[VROXWLRQWKH(8KDVDWWHPSWHGWRFUHDWHDµTXDVL-PDUNHW¶WR
mimic the market mechanism, and regulate carbon outputs. The ETS is therefore constructed along 
Coasean perspectives of regulation: in the presence of a negative externality the market will provide 
an economically superior bargain than regulation or litigation.24 
Despite the prima facie simplicity of the ETS, it was challenged in the courts over forty times 
in the first four years of its operation.25 In these cases, the Court of Justice rarely addressed the 
environmental merits of schemes such as the ETS; instead it settled questions as to whether or not the 
EU and the Commission have competence under the EU Constitution to impose such schemes.26 
Evaluations of the ETS performance have been generally positive, with supporters pointing to the 
abatement in EU emissions it has produced, its role in promoting investment in clean technology and 
its lack of negative impacts on economic growth.27 On the other hand, there have been setbacks 
including the over-allocation of allowances which precipitated a price crash in the value of credits, 
and fraud.28 More fundamentally, carbon trading frameworks might be flawed as currently constructed 
because they permit some of the largest polluters to pay to continue emitting GHGs and aggregate 
emissions will therefore not drop.29 This latter important criticism is indicative of flaws in market-led 
approaches to regulation, particularly in the presence of threats of the order and complexity of climate 
change. 
 
B. EU markets for green financial products 
                                                          
21
 Directive 2009/29/EC Of The European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 amending Directive 
2003/87/EC so as to improve and extend the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading scheme of the 
Community. 
22
 D Campbell, M Klaes and C Bignell, µAfter Cancun: The IPSRVVLELOLW\ RI &DUERQ 7UDGLQJ¶  
University of Queensland Law Journal 163. 
23
 The EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets_en accessed 26 January 
2018. 
24
 5&RDVHµThe Problem of Social Cost¶ (1960) 3 Journal of Law and Economics 1. 
25
 S Bogojevic, µEU Climate Change Litigation, the Role of the European Courts, and the Importance of Legal 
&XOWXUH¶ 35 Law & Policy 184. 
26
 See for example, Case C-366/10 The Air Transport Association of America, American Airlines, Inc., 
Continental Airlines, Inc., United Airlines, Inc. v The Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change [2011] 
OJ C 260/9, which challenged the validity of Directive 2008/101 in light of international law and international 
customary principles. 
27
 M Muûls, J Colmer, R Martin, and UJ Wagner, µEvaluating the EU Emissions Trading System: Take it or 
leave it? An assessment of the data after ten yHDUV¶ Grantham Institute Briefing Paper No 21 (October 2016).  
28
 T Laing, M Sato, M Grubb and C Comberti, µAssessing the effectiveness of the EU Emissions Trading 
6\VWHP¶ Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy Working Paper No. 126 (January 2013). 
29
 Campbell et al above note 22. 
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The EU has also focused on innovative financial instruments which are designed to leverage 
established financial structures for use in green investments, which in some cases have struggled to 
gain traction amongst investors.30 Asset forms to have emerged since 2007 which explicitly cater for 
investors wishing to place capital in sustainable investments include green bonds, green asset-backed 
securities (ABS) and green mortgages. 
 
1. Green bonds 
Like regular bonds, a green bond is a fixed-income debt instrument to allow issuers to raise finance 
from investors via the capital markets. They differ from plain vanilla or regular bonds in that the 
µJUHHQ¶ODEHO signifies a commitment that the proceeds used from the bond sale will be used to finance 
only green projects, assets or businesses. The EU was the first institution to introduce green bonds 
(via the EIB) in 2007.31 Since 2014, market-led green bond programmes have started to pick up; 
global issuance nearly doubled between 2015 and 2016 to reach $92 billion.32  Given the long-term, 
generally stable, features of energy efficiency investing, bond markets provide a highly attractive 
source for capital for investments in long-term infrastructure, green buildings and energy efficient 
industries. 
 
2. Green ABS 
In spite of the growth of green bond markets, it is recognised that bond markets are not always 
appropriate for capital raising, because of problems of scalability and investor exposure. As noted by 
the Climate Bond Initiative: 
a number of low-carbon infrastructure investments ± such as rooftop solar photovoltaic (PV), small-
scale wind, energy efficiency upgrades, electric vehicles and energy storage projects ± are smaller scale 
and prevented from accessing the bond markets directly, as such assets require aggregation to create 
the deal size typically sought by bond market investors (typically at least ¼ PLOOLRQ DQG XVXDOO\
above).33 
 
Accordingly, the EU has also sought to exploit the centrepiece of the EU Capital Markets Union34 
                                                          
30
 For example, in 2017, a new European Green Securities Steering Committee was launched with the goal of 
promoting green securities market development in the EU. See S Kidney, µNew EU Green Securities Steering 
Committee to Promote Climate FinancH 2SSRUWXQLWLHV¶ Climate Bonds Initiative, 4 July 2017 at 
https://www.climatebonds.net/2017/07/new-eu-green-securities-steering-committee-promote-climate-finance-
opportunities  
31
 7KH(,%LVVXHGWKHZRUOG¶VILUVW*UHHQ%RQGODEHOOHGD&OLPDWH$ZDUHQHVV%RQG&$%$VRI'HFHPEHU
(,%UHPDLQHGWKHODUJHVWLVVXHURI*UHHQ%RQGVZLWKRYHU¼EQraised across 11 currencies. 
32
 6HH&OLPDWH%RQGV,QLWLDWLYHµ%RQGVDQG&OLPDWH&KDQJH 7KH6WDWHRIWKH0DUNHW¶ 
33
 S Kidney, D Giuliani & B Sonerud, µStimulating private market development in green securitisation in 
Europe: the public sector DJHQGD¶ Climate Bonds Initiative (April 2017) 4. 
34
 Communication From The Commission To The European Parliament, The Council, The European Economic 
And Social Committee And The Committee Of The Regions Action Plan on Building a Capital Markets Union 
Brussels, 30.9.2015 COM(2015) 468. 
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project, the new EU Regulation on Securitisation (SR).35 This instrument provides the potential for an 
expansion of green finance where bond sales are infeasible. The capacity to securitise individual 
loans, pool them and sell securities on to investors provided by the SR circumvents the scalability of 
bond issuance, by ensuring that any ABS issued exceed these thresholds. The OECD estimates that 
annual global issuance of green asset-backed securities in the EU could reach up to $77 billion per 
annum by 2035, for renewable energy, energy efficiency and low emission automobiles.36 Many large 
corporations are already issuing such instruments.37  
 
3. Green Mortgages 
Importantly, these initiatives have spread to the mortgage market, in particular through work done by 
DG Climate Action.38 The policy proposals arise in the context of several regulatory amendments to 
have been undertaken in the EU since the turn of the twenty-first century. In 2002, the EU introduced 
the Energy Performance of %XLOGLQJ¶V'LUHFWLYH39 (restated in 2010) which requires Member States to 
produce legislation requiring the use of Energy Performance Certificates (EPCs) to rate the energy 
efficiency (consumption and demand) of buildings. The Energy Efficiency Directive introduced 
binding measures to produce increases in energy efficiency of at least 20% by 2020, and 30% by 
2030.40 IQWKHZRUOG¶VILUVWJUHHQUHWDLOmortgage backed security (RMBS) was issued.41 Given 
the size of the global mortgage market, green RMBS represent an ideal asset class to be used to push 
on green financial innovations. 
 
4. Green market-based finance: Brief conclusions 
Markets in the EU for so-called green financial products have significant growth potential in the EU, 
although scaling them will likely be difficult thanks to standardisation issues (which the HLEG, as 
discussed below, attempts to address). Yet, placing trust in the market mechanism to deliver efficient 
and climate-friendly capital allocation is unlikely to fully reflect the risks posed by underlying 
structural impediments to greening the EU financial system; in particular, the twin threats of investor 
short-termism and flawed risk management processes. As I shall explain in later sections, such 
                                                          
35
 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of The European Parliament and of The Council laying 
down common rules on securitisation and creating a European framework for simple, transparent and 
standardised securitisation, Brussels, 30.9.2015 COM(2015) 472 final 2015/0226 (COD) [hereinafter SR 
Proposal]. 
36
 OECD, Green bonds: Mobilising the debt capital markets for a low-carbon transition, December 2015. 
37
 Ibid. 
38
 European Commission and DG Climate Action, Shifting Private Finance Toward Climate-Friendly 
Investments (March 2015). 
39
 Directive 2010/31/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 2010 on the energy 
performance of buildings. 
40
 Directive 2012/27/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on energy 
efficiency, amending Directives 2009/125/EC and 2010/30/EU and repealing Directives 2004/8/EC and 
2006/32/EC. 
41
 Dutch-EDVHG2EYLRQLVVXHGWKHZRUOG¶VILUVWJUHHQ5HVLGHQWLDO0RUWJDJH-Backed Security (RMBS)  in  June  
D¼P  deal  certified  under  the  Climate  Bonds  Standard.  
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market-based initiatives are unlikely to address these factors. This is particularly relevant in EU credit 
markets, which remain dominated by incumbent banks. 
 
 
C. Tackling short-termism: HLEG and the Capital Markets Union Action Plan 
³)LQDQFLDO Parkets are prone to short-WHUPLVP´ is a finding well-established in the literature (and 
certainly not confined to climate-related finance). There is substantial evidence that both incentives 
and investment horizons within the financial industry are so skewed towards the short-term ± what 
Mark &DUQH\KDVFKDUDFWHULVHGDV³WKHWUDJHG\RIWKHKRUL]RQ´42 ± as to be insurmountable. As Carney 
notes, breaking this tragedy is key to the sustainability agenda. Such obstacles include: mismatched 
LQYHVWPHQWKRUL]RQVEDVHGXSRQDµGRXEOHFRPSUHVVLRQRIWLPe and risk;43 very high equity turnover 
rates by large investors which weaken incentives for long-term engagement;44 frequent financial 
reporting, which induces managerial short-termism (myopia);45 compensation systems which 
prioritise short-term targets46; and the career concerns of fund managers, whose performances are 
evaluated over limited timescales and benchmarked against those of their peers. 47 
 In view of such obstacles, the HLEG was established to identify ways in which investment in 
green financial assets could be boosted. Despites the aforementioned EU initiatives, investment in 
clean energy technologies has fallen from $35 billion in the second quarter of 2011 to an average of 
$10-$15 billion per quarter over the last few years.48 Indeed, the HLEG announced that the EU 
remains likely to miss its own 2030 energy policy target of ¼ WULOOLRQ LQYHVWPHQW WKH FXUUHQW
DQQXDO GHILFLW LV ¼ ELOOLRQ RU ¼ WULOOLRQ EHWZHHQ  DQG .49 EU regulators regard 
arresting this deficit as crucial in adapting to the threat of climate change. 
On this basis, the recommendations of the HLEG form the basis of the latest iteration of the 
(8¶V&DSLWDO0DUNHWV8QLRQ$FWLRQ3ODQSXEOLVKHGLQ0DUFKZKLFKLQWHUDOLDDUJXHGIRUWKH
following: 
 
(i) Establishing a common language for sustainable finance, i.e. a unified EU classification 
system ± or taxonomy ± to define what is sustainable; 
                                                          
42
 0DUN&DUQH\µ%UHDNLQJWKH7UDJHG\RIWKH+RUL]RQ± climate change and finanFLDOVWDELOLW\¶VSHHFKJLYHQDW 
/OR\G¶VRI/RQGRQ6HSWHPEHU 
43
 See note 7 above p19. 
44
 AG Haldane, µ3DWLHQFHDQG)LQDQFH¶ Speech at Oxford China Business Forum, Beijing, 2 September 2010. 
45
 F Gigler, C Kanodia, H Sapra and R 9HQXJRSDODQ µ+RZ )UHTXHQW )LQDQFLDO 5HSRUWLQJ &DQ &DXVH
Managerial Short-Termism: An Analysis of the Costs and Benefits of Increasing ReporWLQJ)UHTXHQF\¶
52 Journal of Accounting Research 357. 
46
 J Cullen, Executive Compensation in Imperfect Financial Markets (Elgar, 2014). 
47
 J Chevalier and G (OOLVRQµ&DUHHU&RQFHUQV2I0XWXDO)XQG0DQDJHUV¶4-RI(FRQRPLFV. 
48
 A Louw, µClean EnHUJ\,QYHVWPHQW7UHQGV4¶ Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 5 October 2017, p16. 
49
 EU High-Level Expert Group on Sustainable Finance, Financing a Sustainable European Economy: Interim 
Report, July 2017, p13. 
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(ii) The creation of EU labels for green financial products; 
(iii) Clarification of the duties of asset managers and trustees to consider sustainability in their 
investments; 
(iv) Requiring insurance and investment firms to disclose to clients their sustainability 
preferences; 
(v) Enhancing transparency in corporate reporting; and 
(vi) Exploring ways of incorporating sustainability criteria in prudential requirements which 
apply to banks and insurance companies.50 
 
III. RISK AND UNCERTAINTY: INFORMATION DISCLOSURE AND THE LIMITS OF 
PRIVATELY-DRIVEN CHANGE 
The preceding section discussed some of the legislative and regulatory programmes at EU level 
designed to address climate change via the financial system. Such reforms may seem to be 
unambiguously positive steps towards climate change abatement within the EU. I argue in this 
section, however, that such an approach is likely to fail to address sufficiently the challenge of climate 
change, because the narrative concerning the role of the financial markets in combating this challenge 
remains grounded in classic theories of financial market behaviour, upon which prevailing risk 
management exercises are based. Various factors dictate that basing policy prescriptions upon such 
theories is highly unlikely to provide sufficient incentives for long-term behavioural change on the 
part of banks and other credit providers. Indeed, as I shall explain, they may contribute further to the 
problem if the solutions to climate change are regarded as reducible to the closing of information 
asymmetries through transparency and disclosure initiatives. 
 
A. Rationality and Investment Risk 
Traditional approaches to financial risk management and regulation are founded upon the view that 
the market ± as an epistemic device ± is uniquely endowed with the capacity to evaluate and price 
risk. These frameworks in the EU are underpinned by the rational investor model.51 In short, this 
model holds that investors inter alia: correctly calculate expected values as the probability-weighted 
sum of potential outcomes, and make decisions fully consistent with these estimates; are equally and 
fully informed; and all share the same beliefs and risk preferences.52 Whilst these assumptions may be 
relaxed in specific circumstances, agents in macroeconomic models largely conform to this view of 
investors in the aggregate. In such models, a single, representative agent is used to represent the 
actions of all agents within the model; this agent maximizes well-ordered preferences subject to 
                                                          
50
 European Commission, Sustainable finance: Commission's Action Plan for a greener and cleaner economy, 
Brussels, 8 March 2018. 
51
 Eilis Ferran, Building an EU Securities Market (Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
52
 B Jones, µAsset Bubbles: Re-thinking Policy for the Age of Asset Management¶ Working Paper No. 15/27, 
2015. 
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specific constraints (which are normally budgetary and/or temporal) and acts upon full and complete 
information.53  
In consequence, at its most rudimentary level, the rational investor model posits that the 
predictions of agents will be correct on average over time. In other words, although the future is not 
IXOO\ SUHGLFWDEOH DJHQWV¶ H[SHFWDWLRQV DUH DVVXPHG QHLWKHU WR EH V\VWHPDWLFDOO\ ELDVHG QRr lead to 
collective errors, with any deviations from this (perfect foresight) regarded as random.54 As a result, 
rational expectations do not differ systematically or predictably from equilibrium results. Absorbing 
this information of course results in priFH ZKLFK SURYLGHV QRW RQO\ DQ REMHFWLYH ³YDOXH´ EXW DOVR
important foundations for risk management and strategy. Because the market ± given full information 
± can price any eventuality, there exists a market of complete contingent contracts with an assigned 
probability for each anticipated state. As Fama ± a Nobel-prize winning proponent of such theories ± 
notes, D FULWLFDO UHTXLUHPHQW IRU WKLV SULFH IRUPDWLRQ LV WKDW DOO ³LPSRUWDQW FXUUHQW LQIRUPDWLRQ LV
DOPRVWIUHHO\DYDLODEOHWRDOOSDUWLFLSDQWV´ 55 But what does this mean for financial market regulation?  
 
B. Legal and Regulatory Implications of Informational Theories 
In the case of financial markets, regulators provide legal and regulatory frameworks so that publicly-
listed corporations and financial institutions reduce asymmetries by making disclosures about various 
aspects of, and risks to, their businesses. In the case of the EU, the vast majority of such climate-
related factors disclosures are at present voluntary. An exception is the Non-Financial Reporting 
Directive which UHTXLUHVGLVFORVXUHUHODWLQJ WRDVD³PLQLPXPHQYLURQPHQWDOVRFLDODQGHPSOR\HH
matters, respect for human rights, anti-corruption and bribery matters.´56 However, the view that 
given more information, markets will be able to better manage the transition to lower carbon states 
remains pervasive; it is championed by those most closely associated with green finance 
developments in the EU, as can be seen from the recommendations by the HLEG and under the CMU. 
A recent example is instructive: the CMU project follows the TCFD recommendation to encourage 
FHUWDLQ ILQDQFLDO LQVWLWXWLRQV WR ³GHYHORS YROXQWDU\ FRQVLVWHQW FOLPDWH-related financial disclosures 
that would be useful to investors, lenders, and insurance underwriters in understanding material 
ULVNV´57 Such voluntary disclosures ³ZRXOG HQDEOH VWDNHKROGHUV WR XQGHUVWDQG EHWWHU WKH
concentrations of carbon-UHODWHGDVVHWVLQWKHILQDQFLDOVHFWRUDQGWKHILQDQFLDOV\VWHP¶VH[SRVXUHVWR
                                                          
53
 $VQRWHGE\+DQGV³7KLV LV WKH µUDWLRQDOHFRQRPLFDJHQW¶RIPDLQVWUHDPPLFURHFRQRPLFV²the agent who 
maximizes a well-behaved utility function subject to a budget constraint in demand theory and makes decisions 
based on maximization of expected utility in risky environments²as well as the rational individual agents in 
µGHFLVLRQWKHRU\¶DQGµUDWLRQDOFKRLFHWKHRU\¶«WKLVIDPLOLDUXWLOLW\-maximizing individual is used to model the 
demand, supply or equilibrium of an entire market or characterize the equilibriXPRIDQHQWLUHHFRQRP\´6HH
DW Hands, Conundrums of the representative agent (2017) 41 Cambridge Journal of Economics 1685. 
54
 E Avgouleas, µThe Global Financial Crisis and the Disclosure Paradigm in European Financial Regulation: 
The Case for Reform¶ (2009) 6 European Company and Financial Law Review 440. 
55
 EF Fama, µ5DQGRP:DONVLQ6WRFN0DUNHW3ULFHV¶Financial Analysts Journal 55, 56  
56
 EU Directive 2014/95/EU regarding disclosure of nonfinancial and diversity information by certain large 
companies and groups OJ L 330. 
57
 See note 19 above at piii.  
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climate-UHODWHG ULVNV´58 The FSB noted that financial sector disclosures would assist investors and 
regulators in at least two key ways: (i) ³IRVWHU DQ HDUO\ DVVHVVPHQW RI >FOLPDWH-UHODWHG@ ULVNV´ DQG
³IDFLOLWDWHPDUNHWGLVFLSOLQH´DQG (ii) ³SURYLGHDVource of data that can be analy[s]ed at a systemic 
OHYHOWRIDFLOLWDWHDXWKRULWLHV¶DVVHVVPHQWVRIWKHPDWHULDOLW\RIDQ\ULVNVSRVHGE\FOLPDWHFKDQJHWR
WKHILQDQFLDOVHFWRUDQGWKHFKDQQHOVWKURXJKZKLFKWKLVLVPRVWOLNHO\WREHWUDQVPLWWHG´59  
In this vein, Mark Carney, Chairman of the FSB and Governor of the Bank of England, has 
DUJXHG WKDW ³>I@LQDQFLDO PDUNHWV KDYH WKH SRWHQWLDO WR LPSURYH RXU SURVSHFWV IRU WDFNOLQJ FOLPDWH
FKDQJHEXWRQO\LIZHPDNHFOLPDWHULVNVDQGRSSRUWXQLWLHVPRUHWUDQVSDUHQW´60 Carney elaborates as 
follows on this point: 
 
Along with analysis of wider market conditions, investors need accurate data. The more incomplete or 
opaque the data and analysis, the more inefficient are markets. Yet the climate-related risks and 
opportunities businesses face are currently shrouded in secrecy. Having information on such risks 
would allow investors to back their convictions with their capital, whether they are climate optimists or 
pessimists, evangelicals or sceptics. It would also permit corporates not only to meet investor demand 
for information, but also to position their businesses to win, rather than be left behind in, the transition 
to a low-FDUERQHFRQRP\«E\DFWLQJ LQ WKHLURZQLQWHUHVWV OHading companies, banks and investors 
from across the G20 are helping society address one of the gravest challenges we face. The more 
transparent and effective we make markets, the more we will all benefit.61 
 
Statements such as this bear all the hallmarks of similar pronouncements on the efficiency and 
effectiveness of market-determined pricing, according the market ± even in the face of a challenge as 
great as climate change ± with the role as primary arbiter of the level and character of adjustments to 
industrial strategies and investor portfolio preferences. IQ &DUQH\¶V ODQJXDJH WKH UHOHYDQW PL[ RI
LQYHVWRUVEHWZHHQ³RSWLPLVWVDQGSHVVLPLVWVHYDQJHOLFDOVRUVFHSWLFV´ZLOOGHWHUPLQHWKHDOORFDWLRQV
of investment capital to particular projects and their convictions will be tested by future events.  
Yet, as I shall explain in remaining sections, characterising the information gaps in market 
understanding of the financial risks of climate change by using such terms as ³VHFUHF\´ RU 
³ZLQ>QLQJ@´ is highly dubious. For example, it is trite to observe that the risks from climate change to 
economic and financial systems are not hidden; this implies that someone, somewhere has the 
requisite information to address the problem and, by implication that the problem contemplated is 
soluble. In reality, there is no agreement even on the likely shape of the damage function in relation to 
climate change, still less any consensus on what this will mean for financial markets. Moreover, there 
                                                          
58
 Financial Stability Board, Proposal for a Disclosure Task Force on Climate-Related Risks, 9 November 2015. 
59
 Ibid. 
60
 Mark Carney, µBetter market information can help combat climate change¶ Financial Times, 28 June 2017, 
https://www.ft.com/content/51e60772-5bf5-11e7-b553-e2df1b0c3220?mhq5j=e6.  
61
 Ibid. IndicativHO\WKH(XURSHDQ%DQNLQJ)HGHUDWLRQ(%)DUJXHVWKDW³&OHDUWHUPLQRORJ\PXVWEHGHILQHG
and financial regulation needs to be assessed at every level to achieve optimal disclosure and transparency and 
WR HQVXUH VXFFHVV« A common taxonomy, set of minimum standards and disclosure framework on Green 
)LQDQFH DUH HVVHQWLDO IRU HIILFLHQW DOORFDWLRQ RI ILQDQFLDO UHVRXUFHV WR JUHHQ SURMHFWV«´ 6HH (%)7RZDUGV D
*UHHQ )LQDQFH )UDPHZRUN    WKH7&)' DUJXHV WKDW ³:LWKRXW WKH ULJKW LQIRUPDWLRQ LQYHVWRUV DQd 
RWKHUV PD\ LQFRUUHFWO\ SULFH RU YDOXH DVVHWV OHDGLQJ WR D PLVDOORFDWLRQ RI FDSLWDO«,QFUHDVLQJ WUDQVSDUHQF\
makes markets more efficient and economies more stDEOHDQGUHVLOLHQW´6HHQRWH above p3. 
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DUH IHZ REMHFWLYH EDVHV XSRQ ZKLFK WR EH ³RSWLPLVWLF´ RU ³SHVVLPLVWLF´ UHJDUGLQJ WKH SRWHQWLDO
consequences of climate change, particularly in extreme outcomes. These factors have important 
consequences for the regulation of financial markets, particularly in relation to banks which finance 
activities that contribute to climate change. 
 
 
IV. RISK MANAGEMENT, FINANCE AND CLIMATE CHANGE 
 
As I explained earlier, my critique of current EU initiatives is based upon the limitations of the 
PDUNHW¶V capacity to produce sustainable climate-friendly investment policies. I shall now outline 
some objections to the view that increasing information disclosure will drive financial institutions to 
produce more efficient capital allocation, particularly in relation to risks for which we have no reliable 
risk management capacities, including substantial climate alteration. 
 
A. The Uncertainties of Climate Change 
 
Risk management techniques normally employed to evaluate the relative economic costs and benefits 
of particular policies and/or regulatory interventions include forms of cost-benefit analysis (CBA). 
CBA, however, is regarded by most analysts as an inappropriate tool for setting GHG emission targets 
in the context of climate change.62 Such costs and benefits are normally expressed in monetary values, 
providing a marginal financial assessment of the desirability of various interventions. In ascribing 
such monetary values, variances in the net present marginal costs and benefits of regulatory 
action/inaction must be finite.  Climate change risk, however, does not conform to such parameters; in 
fact, the costs may be infinite.63 Such risks are heavy- or fat-tailed, meaning that the extreme 
downsides of large temperature changes are non-negligible.64 As warming increases, the damage 
function may rise more rapidly and eventually tend towards 100% at very high warming. In the face 
of such a calculus the pressures placed on the market to correctly interpret the potential damages 
inflicted on the economy from climate change are enormous. Briefly, such risk management 
techniques must grapple with the following: 
 
 
 
                                                          
62
   C Azar and K Lindgren, µCatastrophic Events and Stochastic Cost-benefit Analysis of &OLPDWH &KDQJH¶
(2003) 56 Climatic Change 245. 
63
 GN Mandel and JT Gathii, µCost-Benefit Analysis versus the Precautionary Principle: Beyond Cass 
6XQVWHLQ¶V/DZVRI)HDU¶ (2006) 5 University of Illinois Law Review 1037. 
64
 NN Taleb, Y Bar-Yam, R Douady, J Norman and R Read, µThe Precautionary Principle: Fragility and Black 
Swans from Policy Actions¶ 24 July 2014. 
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1. Structural Uncertainties 
Structural uncertainties attached to the complexity of the global ecosystem and the inherent 
difficulties in establishing links between GHG emissions and a variety of distinct climate and 
ecosystem phenomena65 as well as the effects, valuation and temporality of climate change, make 
meaningful evaluations of scales of damages speculative at best. Weitzman, a renowned Harvard 
climate economist, argues that:  
 
The unprecedented scale and speed of GHG increases brings us into uncharted territory and makes 
predictions of future climate change very uncertain. Looking ahead a century or two, the levels of 
atmospheric GHGs that may ultimately be attained (unless decisive measures are undertaken) have 
likely not existed for tens of millions of years, and the speed of this change may be unique on a time 
scale of hundreds of millions of years.66  
 
The complexity inherent in tampering with real world systems ± in this case, climate alteration ± 
means that a certain class of systemic risks will remain unknown.67 This unknowability reduces 
drastically the utility of traditional risk-management exercises, to the point that they overwhelm any 
risk management tools employed by financial institutions and other market actors. In tandem with the 
rapid development of climate science in recent years, concerns about the uncertainty of possible 
consequences have metastasised, in particular in relation to the gross underestimation in many 
financial models of the impacts of potentially catastrophic outcomes.68 
 
2. Data Interpretation 
Even if one could agglomerate all relevant data, there is no consensus on the probabilities of warming 
upon which to base any serious policy solutions contemplated. Whilst the TCFD for example 
encourages financial institutions to engage in scenario analysis for risk management purposes, its 
most extreme scenario contemplates 2°C warming by the end of this century. Yet, the World Bank 
HVWLPDWHV WKDW HYHQXQGHUD ³PHGLXPEXVLQHVV-as-XVXDOSDWKZD\´ WKHUH LV DFKDQFHRIDW OHDVW
4°C warming by 2100.69 Importantly, the World Bank Report is by no means isolated in its outlook.70 
                                                          
65
 As an example of this uncertainty, the IPCC in 2001 argued that global temperatures might rise anywhere 
between 1.4°C and 5.8°C by 2100; however, no assessment was made of the relative likelihood of intermediate 
warming values, because the scientists involved held significantly divergent views on the scale of warming, and 
consequently believed that a single probability distribution could not capture this divergence. 
66
 M Weitzman, µFat-Tailed Uncertainty in the Economics RI&DWDVWURSKLF&OLPDWH&KDQJH¶ Review of 
Environmental Economics and Policy 275. 
67
 M Weitzman, µGHG targets as insurance againVWFDWDVWURSKLFFOLPDWHGDPDJHV¶ Journal of Public 
Economic Theory 221. 
68
 16WHUQµ7KH6WUXFWXUHRI(FRQRPLF0RGHOLQJRIWKH3RWHQWLDO,PSDFWVRI&OLPDWH&KDQJH*UDIWLQJ*URVV
Underestimation of Risk onto Already Narrow Science ModHOV¶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Journal of Economic Literature 838. 
69
  World Bank Group, Turn Down the Heat: Confronting the New Climate Normal, 2014. According to 
Covington and Thamotheram of Cambridge and Oxford Universities respectively, these World Bank Reports 
³describe a world for which projections are highly uncertain, climatic tipping points may be exceeded and 
impacts may cascade at regional scales. They estimate that about 60% of the global land surface will be 
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At such levels, economic damage becomes severe: Dietz and Stern estimate that under such a 4°C 
warming scenario, annual GDP will be 50% lower compared to a scenario where no warming 
occurs.71 Moreover, there is no mechanism with which investors and institutions may protect 
themselves from losses via countervailing policies, insurance or investment diversification to offset 
the risks involved to the value of their assets and future profitability. Some estimates place the levels 
RIVXFK³XQKHGJHDEOH´ULVNDWDURXQGKDOIRIWKHWRWDORISRWHQWLDOLPSDFWVRQILQDQFLDO asset values.72 
 
3. Non-linearities in the climate system 
The compounded effects of events in a non-linear system such as the global climate, in which small 
changes in one part of the system may lead to large, unpredictable effects in another, mean that 
environmental damages may be severely underestimated.73 In such systems, the stability of each 
constituent is a function of its linkages with other constituents. Real-world coupling and/or 
connectivity between complex systems may cause them to exhibit patterns and behaviours which are 
XQSUHGLFWDEOH SURGXFH ³VXUSULVHV´74 and are therefore intractable for modelling purposes.75  
Moreover, these systems are also RIWHQSURQHWR³WLSSLQJSRLQWV´DUHIHUHQFH to a critical threshold at 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
subjected to unprecedented heat extremes, implying a completely new climatic regime posing immense pressure 
globally on natural and human systems. There will be severe droughts, major floods, inundations of coastal 
cities, unprecedented heat waves and more high-intensity cyclones. Monthly temperatures will increase by six 
standard deviations in the tropics and two to five standard deviations in the mid-latitudes. The warmest July 
could be 9 [degrees celsius] warmer in the central US and Mediterranean than the warmest July at present. There 
will be substantially increased water scarcity, increased risks to global and regional food production, an increase 
in ocean acidity of one and a half times and an irreversible loss in biodiversity´ 6HH + &RYLQJWRQ and R 
7KDPRWKHUDPµThe Case for Forceful Stewardship (Part 1): The Financial Risk from Global WaUPLQJ¶ (2015) 
p7-8 available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2551478.  
70
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which very small disturbances can qualitatively alter the state or future development of a system.76 
Because damages tend toward 100% at the extremes, ³at some point along the warming scale there 
will be an economic tipping point at which the climate damage function rises very rapidly from the 
OHYHOSURSRVHGE\« standard model[s].´77 
 
B. The banking system and uncertainty 
 
The EU banking system remains a heavy financier of fossil-fuel companies. Analysis of the 
international syndicated loan market demonstrates that between 2004 and 2014, WKHZRUOG¶VODUJHVW
commercial banks channelled at least $1.85 trillion to the top fossil fuel industries, compared with just 
$171 billion to renewable energy.78 A large proportion of climate damages will be caused by 
continued funding of GHG-intensive industries by banks, who as a group are expected to invest more 
than $6 trillion in fossil fuels over the next decade.79 Research shows that of the top fifteen funders of 
³H[WUHPH´80 fossil fuel activities, four were headquartered in the EU, contributing over $45 billion 
between them to such activities in the period 2012-2016.81 Another recent report shows that the fifteen 
largest European banks inter alia still: carry significant exposures to climate-related liabilities and 
risk; all (bar one) have no explicit objectives for decreasing such exposures; and none could 
accurately report on the ratio of high-carbon assets amongst their risk-weighted assets (RWAs).82 EU 
regulators already acknowledge the vulnerability of banks to asset writedowns thanks to climate-
related events or changes in financial regulation.83 Other research shows that over fifty percent of 
bank assets in the Euro area are exposed to climate change-related risks.84 Such institutions remain 
under-prepared for the effects that climate-related losses may have on their capital positions.  
The banking sector accordingly acts a significant accelerator of climactic risks.85 Even if one 
assumes that such risks can be modelled to some degree of accuracy (which of course is not the 
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contention of this article) the foreseeable systemic risks from climate shifts are significant. 
Catastrophe risk insurance for example is becoming increasingly expensive, with some insurers 
simply withdrawing from the market. This exposes the banking system to higher order losses, because 
if companies cannot insure themselves against catastrophe risk ± or are charged high prices for doing 
so ± their ability to withstand losses occurring due to climate-related events will be lowered 
significantly and, if they are counterparties to banks, any distress they face may be transmitted to the 
banking system.86 Ex ante, any resulting reduction in collateral values from seriously damaging 
weather events would lead to reduced lending, imposing further feedbacks to the wider economy.87 
These dynamics also operate ex post; losses from natural disasters increase the probability of bank 
failure over the medium term following the relevant event.88 Exogenous shocks such as natural 
disasters may also lead financial institutions (especially insurance companies) exposed to losses to sell 
bonds at fire sale discounts, adding to any fall in collateral values.89  
Yet, these estimates do not account for the potential extreme losses that realisable under the 
heavy-tailed distributions discussed in this section, and do not address the supply of financial 
instruments which fund GHG-intensive activities. If eventuated, such losses have the potential to 
collapse the entire financial system, as spillovers from losses on assets are amplified. Moreover, any 
failure to correct the flows of finance to GHG-intensive assets may result in irreversible economic 
damages far beyond the financial sector. On this basis, I shall argue in the final section that the EU 
ought to use the opportunity it has been presented with by the findings of the HLEG to fundamentally 
shift its approach to the bank financing of assets which contribute to climate shifts. 
 
 
V. PRECAUTIONARY APPROACHES TO BANK FINANCING OF GHG INDUSTRIES 
 
The preceding analysis revealed the limitations in applying traditional risk management techniques to 
the problem of climate change. This section explores how a precautionary framework to climate 
finance may be usefully employed in the EU, specifically in the case of reducing the flow of finance 
from the EU banking system to GHG-intensive projects.  
 
A. The Precautionary Principle in EU Law 
 
Although agreement on its definition is not universally agreed, the central claim of the precautionary 
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principle is that the absence of definitive evidence of harm should not be used as the basis for a 
decision not to take action. In doing so, it also aims to avoid the potential costs of inaction, which may 
outweigh the short-term costs of adopting a precautionary approach. For example, the most widely 
referenced articulation of the precautionary principle, Principle 15 of the 1992 Rio Declaration, states 
WKDW³LQRUGHUWRSURWHFWWKHHQYLURQPHQWWKHSUHFDXWLRQDU\DSSURDFKVKDOOEHZLGHO\DSSOLHGE\6WDWHV
according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full 
scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent 
HQYLURQPHQWDOGHJUDGDWLRQ´90 Similar terms are used in the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate 
Change.91  
Although there have been some doubts expressed in the US and elsewhere concerning the 
status of the precautionary principle in law92, the EU has adopted a precautionary approach in 
circumstances it considers appropriate. Indeed, the Commission went as far as formally endorsing its 
use in legal analysis.93 Beyond using the precautionary principle in its approach to climate change, the 
EU has applied it to health protection94, biodiversity management,95 chemical management96 and 
emerging technologies.97 TKLVDSSURDFKILQGVVXSSRUWLQWKH(8¶s policy towards the environment; the 
EU Treaty Article 174(2)98 states: 
  
Community policy on the environment shall aim at a high level of protection taking into account the 
diversity of situations in the various regions of the Community. It shall be based on the precautionary 
principle and on the principles that preventive action should be taken, that environmental damage should as 
a SULRULW\EHUHFWLILHGDWVRXUFH« 
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In common with virtually all official articulations of the principle, the EU affirms the view that 
prevention of a potential harm is preferable to ex post correction of its effects. The precautionary 
principle is also most appropriately invoked in relation to circumstances in which large or irreversible 
side effects are possible.99 In the case of climate change, the IPCC has argued that some impacts from 
climate changH ZLOO ³FRQWLQXH IRU FHQWXULHV´ HYHQ LI DOO HPLVVLRQV IURP IRVVLO-fuel burning were to 
VWRSDQGWKDWFRQWLQXHGHPLVVLRQRI*+*VDWFXUUHQWOHYHOVZRXOGOLNHO\OHDGWR³VHYHUHSHUPDQHQW
DQG LUUHYHUVLEOHGDPDJH´100 On this basis, overreacting to small probabilities is not irrational when 
the potential effects are large.101  
In deciding whether to apply the principle, the Commission states the relevant authority 
should: start with a scientific evaluation, as complete as possible, and where possible, identifying at 
each stage the degree of scientific uncertainty; perform an evaluation of various risk-management 
options, to include the option of taking no precautionary action; and ensure process transparency and 
involve as early as possible all interested parties.102 Where regulatory intervention is deemed 
necessary, the Commission states that any measures should be: 
 
(i) proportionate to the chosen level of protection; 
(ii) non-discriminatory and consistent (meaning that comparable situations should not be 
treated differently); 
(iii) based on cost-benefit analysis, including the costs or benefits of lack of action; and 
(iv) subject to review in light of new scientific information.103 
 
In his otherwise critical appraisal of the use of the precautionary principle in law and regulation, 
6XQVWHLQFRQVLGHUV WKDWWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VFRPPXQLFDWLRQFRQVWLWXWHVD³TXLWHVHQVLEOH´104 direction, 
LQWKDWLWXUJHVFRQVLGHUDWLRQ³within a structured approach to the analysis RIULVN´ WKDWLQFOXGHV³ULVN
DVVHVVPHQWULVNPDQDJHPHQW>DQG@ULVNFRPPXQLFDWLRQ´105 As Sunstein notes, this means that any 
PHDVXUHVEDVHGRQWKHSULQFLSOHPXVWQRWEH³blindly precautionary, but should be non-discriminatory 
in application and consistent with similar measures previously taken´106 More significantly, we can 
see from the above observations that the principle in EU law must satisfy a proportionality condition, 
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LQ UHFRJQLWLRQ RI WKH IDFW WKDW ULVN ³FDQ UDUHO\ EH UHGXFHG WR ]HUR´107 As I shall now explain, 
amendments to bank capital requirements to reflect the environmental risks of certain assets satisfy 
such a requirement.  
B. Precautionary Approaches to EU Bank Regulation 
As I have noted, EU banks remain the most substantial financers of climate-warming industrial and 
corporate activities in the Union and beyond. From the perspective of climate abatement, one possible 
precautionary measure would be the outright prohibition of such credit allocation. However, such a 
prohibition would inevitably cause huge distress, both at financial institutions and in debt and equity 
markets. Introducing regulation too quickly in order to tackle these problems may inadvertently 
cripple the financial system, particularly if large corporations invested in fossil fuels are forced to 
engage in massive writedowns of assets deemed unsustainable. Second-round effects on financial 
institutions with exposures to such firms might also be significant if they are forced to absorb losses. 
Moreover, such a prohibition would also be limited in impact in the absence of any pan-global 
commitment to follow suit. 
On the other hand, in light of preceding discussions, concerted action from financial 
institutions in making significant positive contributions to climate change abatement is unlikely to 
materialise. In the absence of a shift away from a µEXVLQHVV-as-XVXDO¶ approach, there are policy levers 
available to European regulators which could be used to influence the flow of credit to such ventures. 
A proportionate precautionary response to such lending, in line with the parameters set out by the 
Commission, would be to reprice the funding of such activities to reflect externalities created.  In 
particular these levers coalesce around the capital requirements relevant to specific asset classes, 
which may be used to modulate the costs of credit provision, dependent on the requirement applied. 
Such capital requirements are already set for all EU credit institutions at the European level under the 
Capital Requirements Directive (CRD).108  
 
1. The Function of Bank Capital 
In relation to individual institutions, the primary purpose of capital regulation is to mitigate prudential 
risks by ensuring there is a large enough capital buffer to absorb losses in the event of an impairment 
RIDQLQVWLWXWLRQ¶VDVVHWV&DSLWDOUHTXLUHPHQWVDUHWDLORUHGDFFRUGLQJWRWKHFUHGLWULVNRIWhe financial 
products in question, whilst the entire capital adequacy ratio is underpinned by a system of risk-
ZHLJKWLQJRIDVVHWVWKHULVNLHUWKHDVVHWRQWKHEDQN¶VERRNVWKHPRUHFDSLWDOWKHEDQNQHHGVWRIXQG
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LWZLWK NQRZQDVD µFDSLWDOFKDUJH¶109 The fundamental function of such requirements is to guard 
against losses in asset values which might translate into institutional or systemic distress. 
Accordingly, there have been reservations expressed by regulators that they should not be used as 
policy levers:110 the role of capital is not envisaged to mitigate wider risks, even those as grave as 
from climate change.  Rather, only idiosyncratic risks from legal or transaction-level factors are 
deemed relevant. As noted by Alexander in the context of the Basel Capital Accords (which form the 
basis of the CRD)111:  
 
Pillar 1 of Basel GRHVUHTXLUHEDQNVWRDVVHVVWKHLPSDFWRIVSHFLILFHQYLURQPHQWDOULVNVRQWKHEDQN¶V
credit and operational risk exposures, but these are mainly transaction-specific risks that affected the 
ERUURZHU¶VDELOLW\WRUHSD\DORDQRUDGGUHVVWKHµGHHSSRFNHWV¶GRFWULQHRIOHQGHUOLDELOLW\IRUGDPDJHV
and costs of property clean-up. 
 
Reflecting this view, regulators have also failed to yet include climate change as a material risk under 
WKH %DVHO $FFRUG¶V VHFRQG SLOODU RI PDUNHW VXSHUYLVLRQ $FFRUGLQJ WR $OH[DQGHU ³PRVW EDQN
VXSHUYLVRUVKDYHQRWXWLOLVHG3LOODU¶VVXSHUYLVRU\DSSURDFKHVWRLQFRUSRUDWHIRUZDUG-looking models 
that estimate the potential stability impact of supplying credit to environmentally unsustainable or 
VXVWDLQDEOHDFWLYLWLHVRYHUWLPHLQWRWKHLUVWUHVVWHVWV´112 
 
2. Greening the EU Banking System 
Despite these views, the EU has recently signalled that approaches to mitigating climate risk under the 
CRD may be considered. Preparatory work in this field is being undertaken into the feasibility of 
ORZHULQJ FDSLWDO UHTXLUHPHQWV DJDLQVW FHUWDLQ µJUHHQ DVVHWV¶113 which, it is claimed, are excessively 
high under the current asset risk-weighting regime.114 According to the CMU, the Commission 
intends to: 
explore how banks and insurance companies can contribute to funding projects that will ensure the 
transition to a more sustainable economy, where justified from a prudential point of view «
identifying a legally-enforceable classification system will need to go hand in hand with a thorough 
capital calibration in order to not undermine the effectiveness of the EU prudential rules. On this basis, 
the Commission will explore the feasibility of recalibrating the capital requirements for banks (so 
FDOOHG ³JUHHQ VXSSRUWLQJ IDFWRU´ ZKHQ LW LV MXVWLILHG IURP D ULVN SHUVSHFWLYH ZKLOH HQVXULQJ WKDW
financial stability is safeguarded.115 
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There is a precedent for such reforms: lending to EU SMEs is currently accorded preferential capital 
treatment under SME Supporting Factor (SME SF) introduced in 2014 under the Capital 
Requirements Regulation (CRR).116 Similar preferential treatment for infrastructure projects is found 
in EU insurance company regulation.117 Indeed, the Commission has explicitly stated that capital 
UHTXLUHPHQWVPD\EHVXEMHFWWR³targeted adjustments in order to reflect EU specificities and broader 
policy considerations´118 The levels of any reductions under such a supporting scheme for green 
assets would be modelled on the discounts for small SME investments under Article 501 of the CRR, 
FXUUHQWO\ FRPSULVLQJ D FDSLWDO UHGXFWLRQ RI  SHUFHQW IRU EDQNV¶ H[SRVXUHV WR VPDOO ILUPV IRU
investments below ¼PLOOLRQ. 
These reforms have a mooted introductory date of mid-2019. As I have argued, they reflect a 
much-needed change in thinking on the activities of credit institutions in the EU. However, there are 
at least three important objections to this approach to amending credit risk calculations. The first is 
WKDWµJUHHQ¶LQYHVWPHQWVZKLOVWSHUKDSVPRUHGHVLUDEOHIURPDSXEOLFSROLF\VWDQGSRLQWWKDQVR-called 
non-green investments, are no more creditworthy than non-green assets.119 Boot and Scheonmaker 
argue succinctly WKDW UHGXFLQJFDSLWDO UHTXLUHPHQWVIRUJUHHQDVVHWV LV³asking banks to turn a blind 
H\H RQ SURSHU ULVN PDQDJHPHQW DV ZH GRQ¶W NQRZ ZKLFK JUHHQ WHFKQRORJLHV ZLOO ZLQ ,W LV
unacceptable.´120  
The second is that research indicates that incentivising loan origination in this way would 
produce marginal results; banks will simply price loans less aggressively in the event that capital 
requirements are lowered. According to researchers at Cambridge ³UHJXODWRU\ FDSLWDO «
requirements as currently set forth in BaVHO ,,,¶V 3LOODU  DSSURDFK SOD\ DW PRVW D PDUJLQDO UROH LQ
LQIOXHQFLQJDEDQN¶VGHFLVLRQ WRSURYLGHVSHFLDOLVHG OHQGLQJRQSURMHFW ILQDQFHIRUHQYLURQPHQWDOO\
sustainable economic activities such as renewable energy infrastructure projects´121 with other factors 
including political and economic riskiness playing much more prominent roles.122 In line with this, 
there is little evidence that the SME SF has been effective in either lowering borrowing costs or 
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increasing access to finance for SMEs.123 In contrast, what the introduction of the SME SF did lead to 
was a reduction in aggregate EU bank capital of over ¼12 billion, arguably denting financial 
stability.124 Equally undesirable consequences in relation to a green supporting factor cannot be 
discounted. 
Finally, the largest banks in the EU use the internal-based approach to risk weight modelling 
(IRBA), which is permitted under the CRR.125 Nothing prevents larger banks from already lowering 
their capital requirements against particular forms of asset ± including green assets ± provided that 
regulatory approval for their assessments and methodolgoies have been approved by bank supervisors. 
Because large banks in the EU are those most responsible for continued large-scale funding of brown 
assets, and such banks are already given latitude to reduce their capital requirements by regulation, it 
is unlikely that any green asset SF will have any impact on their lending appetite. 
 
3. Penalising Brown Assets 
Thanks to the aforementioned limitations, rather than focusing only on the incentive-generation 
effects of green supporting factors, capital requirements therefore instead ought to be used to penalise 
so-FDOOHG³EURZQ´SURMHFWs, or those which carry high-climate risk. This concept was mooted by the 
HLEG in its Interim Report: 
 
$ µEURZQ-SHQDOLVLQJ¶ IDFWRU UDLVLQJ FDSLWDO UHTXLUHPHQWV WRZDUGV VHFWRUV ZLWK VWURQJ VXVWDLQDELOLW\
risks, would yield a constellation in which risk and policy considerations go in the same direction [as 
rewarding green projects]. Moreover, it would be more focused and easier to rationalise as capturing 
the risk of sudden value lRVVHVGXHWRµVWUDQGHGDVVHWV¶126 
 
It is unclear why the original HLEG initiative was abandoned.  As noted, evidence collated by 
researchers at Cambridge suggests that altering capital requirements downward (for example, under a 
green supporting factor) would likely have a negligible HIIHFWRQEDQNV¶GHFLVLRQVRQZKHWKHUWRPDNH
specific loans.  
In contrast, higher risk-weighted capital requirements are known to disincentivise lending, 
including when targeted at particular asset classes.127 Powers to amend lending in this way are already 
afforded to bank regulators under the CRD and CRR; such an option provides regulators with a 
flexible, targeted tool with which to funnel credit away from particular sectors, and thus decrease 
financial flows to such projects. In the UK for example, the Bank of England is afforded a tool known 
DV WKH 6HFWRUDO &DSLWDO 5HTXLUHPHQW 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RUGHULQFUHDVHEDQNV¶FDSLWDOUHTXLUHPHQWVRQH[SRVXUHVWRVSHFLILFVHFWRUVZKHUHOHQGLQJSRVHVULVNV
WR ILQDQFLDO VWDELOLW\ SURYLGLQJ ³WDUJHWHG LQFHQWLYHV IRU EDQNV WR OLPLW WKH H[SDQVLRQ RI
ULVNLHU«H[SRVXUHV´128 
Increasing the capital required for such assets would also act as an indirect tax on such 
activities. In almost all jurisdictions debt service costs (interest) are deductible against payable taxes, 
whereas any dividends on capital are not.129 By raising the capital requirements on certain brown 
assets, banks would have to fund such assets with a greater proportion of capital (shareholder funds), 
WKHUHE\UDLVLQJEDQNV¶FRVWRIIXQGLQJ6XFKDUHJXODWRU\FKDQJHLVOLNHO\WRPHDQEDQNVZLOOFKDUJH
higher rates for particular asset forms. It also would avoid the potential avenue for banks to use the 
proposed green supporting factor to subsidise funding for brown assets. In the absence of any 
portfolio restrictions operating in tandem with such a green supporting factor, there is substantial 
moral hazard embedded in any preferential prudential treatment for green assets, as such assets may 
be used to cross-subsidise the origination of credit for GHG-intensive purposes.  
If tightening regulations on financial exposures to carbon-intensive firms had the intended 
effect of increasing the cost of finance for those borrowers, this would reduce their ability to diversify 
away from their current activities or to invest in GHG-reduction technologies, unless exclusions can 
be applied to financing specifically earmarked for such investments.130 This is something that must be 
considered alongside any proposal to modify capital requirements with respect to brown assets. 
Nevertheless, a much stronger case can be made for penalising certain brown assets rather than 
introducing a green supporting factor. Not only would this be more stability-inducing than cutting 
capital for green assets, it would discourage banks from funding investments which contribute to 
climate change. This will produce two socially desirable outcomes: increased (rather than lower) loss 
absorbing capacity at financial institutions; and the internalisation of at least some of the costs of 
climate shifts. It would also incentivise a more rapid transition by GHG-intensive firms to a lower 
carbon future by providing cheaper funding for green investment relative to continued capital 
allocation to brown assets. Naturally, a globally-binding measure would be preferable to one which is 
merely EU-wide. On the other hand, EU banks are significant contributories to the funding of brown 
assets outside the Union, and so their activities cannot be evaluated simply on the basis of their role in 
funding emissions internal to the EU. Furthermore, the EU has imposed upon itself targets for the 
reduction of GHG emissions; introducing such measures would assist in this endeavour. The bloc 
remains committed to remaining in the vanguard of climate abatement policies; it must ensure that 
financial regulators are provided with sufficient prudential tools to facilitate such a transition. 
                                                          
128
 Bank of England, The Financial Policy &RPPLWWHH¶VSRZHUV WRVXSSOHPHQWFDSLWDO UHTXLUHPHQWV$3ROLF\
Statement (January 2014) p10. 
129
 SM &KDXGKU\ $ 0XOOLQHX[ 1 $JDUZDO µ%DODQFLQJ WKH UHJXODWLRQ DQG WD[DWLRQ RI EDQNLQJ¶ (2015) 42 
International Review of Financial Analysis 38. 
130
 See note 84 above p6. 
25 
 
A further potential externality of any penalisation of brown assets under bank capital rules 
would be that the financing of such investments would simply migrate to the capital markets, and be 
financed directly either through equity or bond finance.131 However, fears concerning such 
externalities are likely misplaced. Such migration is improbable, largely because capital markets are 
already attuned to the risks of climate shifts and punish perceived transgressors of contemporary 
investment norms, which regard investment in GHG-intensive industries (such as fossil fuels) 
negatively from both financial and ethical perspectives.132 Indeed, significant momentum away from 
investment in such assets has been built: high-profile divestment campaigns restricting the funding 
channels through which high-ESG risk activities may be financed have been widely established.133 
Importantly, such trends expose the banking system as the locus of continued investments in brown 
assets or brown technologies. Despite this centrality, the impetus to force divestment from brown 
assets is not as strong within the banking system as elsewhere in capital markets: bank investors are in 
general much less concerned with long-term performance than other investor types.134 This is even 
more pertinent to the EU because of its aforementioned financial structure, which is heavily biased 
towards banks. Increasing capital requirements on brown assets is highly unlikely to jolt capital 
market participants into funding ventures which many now regard as objectionable from both 
economic and ethical perspectives. In short, the current path evidences contraction, rather than 
expansion, of these funding markets. 
 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
I have argued in this article that a fundamental change in the approach to the funding of brown assets 
ought to be adopted by EU authorities. Existing measures ± and even those proposed by the HLEG ± 
do not sufficiently address the deep uncertainties attached to climate change, which make any 
estimations of damage, both to the financial system and the economy as a whole, speculative in many 
respects. In recommending that particular asset classes be targeted by EU regulators to address the 
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climate change challenge, I recognise that certain political choices must be made. Technocrats are not 
politicians and are not accountable to voters; such restrictions may therefore be regarded by some as 
democratically questionable. However, the challenge of climate change poses a magnitude of risk not 
currently countenanced by financial regulation; measures such as increasing capital against 
investments which contribute to possible outcomes with huge negative externalities are designed to 
mitigate the potential for systemic ruin. Moreover, even if the more optimistic predictors in relation to 
the likely shape of climate damages are correct, we have no way of knowing this today. In such cases, 
a proportionate precautionary measure to shift financial flows away from climate-damaging activities 
should be considered. 
 
 
